Nicolas Martin, Politics, Landlords and Islam in Pakistan by Nelson, Matthew J.
 
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic
Journal 
Book Reviews







Association pour la recherche sur l'Asie du Sud (ARAS)
 
Electronic reference
Matthew J. Nelson, « Nicolas Martin, Politics, Landlords and Islam in Pakistan », South Asia
Multidisciplinary Academic Journal [Online], Book Reviews, Online since 09 May 2016, connection on 30
April 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/samaj/4157 
This text was automatically generated on 30 April 2019.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International License.
Nicolas Martin, Politics, Landlords
and Islam in Pakistan
Matthew J. Nelson
REFERENCES
Martin, Nicolas (2016) Politics, Landlords and Islam in Pakistan, Abingdon: Routledge
(Exploring the Political in South Asia), 192 pages.
Nicolas Martin, Politics, Landlords and Islam in Pakistan
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal , Book Reviews | 2016
1
1 In  his  account  of  landlords  and  their
politics in rural Pakistan (focusing on
central  Punjab),  Nicolas  Martin  offers  a
wealth  of  ethnographic  detail.  From  the
homesickness of indentured child servants
to  clever  forms  of  vote-rigging  in  local
elections  as  well  as  notions  of  spiritual
superiority  mixed  with  social  critique
amongst  the impoverished adepts  of  Sufi
Islam, Martin brings fine-grained forms of
analysis to bear on several familiar themes
in the study of rural Pakistan. Readers will
immediately  appreciate  Martin’s  account
of landlords who succeeded in reproducing
their economic power even after the Green
Revolution (when mechanisation increased
rural  unemployment  and  transformed
countless tenants into raw units of labour).
Those  familiar  with  politics  in  rural
Pakistan will also recognise his account of
powerful  agnatic  kinship  factions  as  key
actors  in  the  context  of  local  elections.
And, of course, few will struggle to grasp his account of the political influence exerted by
the landowning descendants of various Sufi saints. Like so many village-level studies of
the  past—Zekiye  Eglar  (1960),  Saghir  Ahmad  (1977),  Alain  Lefebvre  (1999)—Martin’s
ethnography is complex and illuminating.
2 Analytically, Martin reiterates key findings from my own work (Nelson 2002, 2011) while,
at the same time, expanding those findings in new ways. In particular he builds on my
critique  of  Partha  Chatterjee’s  theorisation  of  subaltern  ‘political  society’  as  a  fresh
approach  to  the  conceptualisation  of  ‘democracy’  in  South  Asia  (2004,  2011).  In
Chatterjee’s account, the poor wield political influence owing to their large numbers; this
influence attracts the attention of elected representatives, who mediate public access to
state resources. In fact electoral accountability is associated with informal and largely
unpredictable forms of political patronage (as opposed to more explicit forms of statutory
intermediation). Patronage, Chatterjee argues, advances the well-being of the poor.
3 Critical of the highly centralised colonial legacy embedded in formal legal (i.e. statutory)
authority, Chatterjee believes that informal patterns of grassroots political interaction
are more responsive to the needs of South Asia’s impoverished majority—and, thus, more
‘democratic’. To make this point he draws attention to forms of patronage associated with
elected  representatives  who  withhold,  however  inconsistently,  the  enforcement  of
existing  property  laws  in  order  to  facilitate  (as  a  matter  of  political  ‘morality’)  the
survival of local slum-dwellers. Because Chatterjee divorces electoral accountability from
any  appreciation  for  promulgating  and  amending  specific  laws,  or  seeking  their
consistent enforcement,  however,  I’ve argued that his notion of  accountability is  not
‘democratic’,  but ‘despotic’  (Nelson 2011).  Martin agrees.  He highlights,  in particular,
patterns  of  economic  dependency  that  shackle  Pakistan’s  rural  poor  to  powerful
landowners—landowners  who,  having  captured  the  state  (in  a  bid  to  sustain  their
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economic power), go on to mediate public access to state resources in ways that, however
intimate, remain irregular and profoundly disadvantageous for the poor.
4 Focusing on a village he calls Bek Sagrana (a pseudonym) in District Sargodha, Martin
describes the rise of a middling landowning clan—the Gondals—bound together by close
cousin marriages.  The Gondals have slowly displaced an aristocratic clan of  absentee
landlords known as the Makhdooms. Both clans draw on Sufi strains of authority, but in
this context the Gondals are depicted as ‘upstarts’. The Makhdooms still own a lot of land,
but like other super-elites who spend most of their time in Lahore, Martin notes that the
Makhdooms have lost touch with the cut and thrust of local disputes. In fact, precisely
insofar as they have failed to make themselves available in the context of those disputes
(via forms of patronage involving bureaucrats, police, judges, and various thugs), they
have seen their political power decline.
5 In the past, Martin explains, the Gondals worked together with one another to battle the
Makhdooms. But, as the influence of the Makhdooms has waned, different factions within
the  Gondal  clan have begun to  compete  with one another.  Their  competition is  not
confined to control over land. Like the Makhdooms before them, they have begun to
diversify: moving their children away from Bek Segrana they have sought out schools to
prepare the next generation for jobs as civil servants, police officials, judges, and (ideally)
professional  jobs  abroad.  Within  Bek  Sagrana,  however,  each  Gondal  faction  is  still
surrounded by various subordinate castes, and the first half of Martin’s book is devoted to
a detailed account of these ‘proletarianised’ tenants and servants—tenants and servants
faced with declining patterns of informal exchange in rural areas (e.g. trading services for
food) and a relentless increase in stripped-down forms of wage labour.
6 Much of the literature detailing the political economy of rural Punjab describes powerful
landowning clans calling on local ‘vote banks’, including tenants and servants, to support
them in their battles (including their electoral battles) with other clans (Mohmand 2014).
Typically, these ‘vote banks’ are described as extended networks of kin who support one
another.  But  there  are  lingering  questions  about  the  mechanisms  whereby  unrelated
tenants and servants come to support this or that landowning faction. To answer this
question, Martin draws on a secondary body of literature concerning debt bondage. As
Martin points out, control over credit (as a routine form of patronage) helps politically
ambitious families pursue their goals. In particular, he notes that debts are attached, not
to individuals,  but to extended kinship groups. Recalling (without citing) some of the
path-breaking work undertaken by Anirudh Krishna (2003), he recounts several stories in
which families struggle to pool their resources to pay off debts resulting from expensive
weddings or medical emergencies. It is not ‘feudal’ loyalties, he notes, but group-based
debts that tie ancillary castes and their children—sent to work as servants in exchange
for  unmet  promises  of  an  improved education—to the  ‘patronage’  of  political  rivals.
Indeed, departing from Martin’s own account of the ‘proletarianisation’ of rural tenants
and servants, it is this reinforcement of kinship ties (via debt) that often frustrates the
emergence of class-based economic and political solidarities.
7 Beyond his account of debt bondage, however, Martin also describes the complex political
rivalries that preoccupy different Gondal factions. This is political  ethnography at its
best.  Closely reflecting the work of scholars like Mohammad Azam Chaudhury (1999),
Martin describes a raft of political machinations that extend from fabricating criminal
cases  (requiring  one’s  gunman  to  shoot  himself  in  the  arm to  frame  an  enemy)  to
implicating one’s rivals in elaborate cattle-thieving manoeuvres.  Within these stories,
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Martin seeks to correct what he sees as an over-emphasis on ‘competing biraderis’ in the
academic literature on political competition in rural Punjab. Instead, following Frederik
Barth’s famous work on Pashtun politics during the 1950s, he draws our attention away
from ‘competing biraderis’ to the agnatic rivalries unfolding within biraderis (in this case,
rival Gondal cousins) instead.
8 This is not a new argument. It is, however, an argument greatly facilitated by Martin’s
decision to conduct fieldwork in a village where the rival Makhdoom biraderi had already
faded from the political limelight, creating in effect a single-dominant-biraderi village.
Here,  rivalries  unfolding  within the  Gondal  biraderi  come into  sharp  relief,  allowing
Martin to highlight the ways in which one faction of Gondal cousins solicits support from
powerful non-Gondals in a bid to defeat its close Gondal rivals. This observation is not
enough to support Martin’s overarching claim that ‘biraderi-based’ factions no longer
provide a key point of political loyalty in the Punjab. It does, however, help to highlight
the  fact  that,  in  villages  like  Bek  Sagrana,  factions  within biraderis  are  at  least  as
important as the rivalries between them.
9 Martin insists that his argument regarding the reproduction of economic and political
dominance among landowning kinship factions—factions that use elections to compete
for access to state power (so that, if they succeed, they are in a position to distribute
access to state resources or impunity as a form of patronage)—is not a strong-society/
weak-state argument like the one associated with Joel  Migdal  (1988)  or  my work on
landed kinship factions and state capture in Lahore, Sialkot, and Sargodha (2002, 2011).
This is odd. It is odd because so much of Martin’s narrative points to exactly this sort of
state-society linkage. As Martin points out, electoral competition in Bek Sagrana does not
involve a competition to advance the well-being of ordinary voters; instead, the primary
goal lies in patronising dependent voters with debt in a push to consolidate the ‘vote
banks’ that might allow one to defeat one’s agnatic rivals en route to a successful push for
state capture. Indeed, Martin reminds us that state capture is essential for those seeking
to reinforce their economic and political power—not only in terms of informal patronage
targeting the poor (e.g. drawing on the police to threaten the families of  absconding
debtors), but also in terms of extending forms of impunity to related landowners who
perform explicitly illegal acts (e.g. debt bondage itself, the manipulation of land revenue
records to formalise violent land seizures post hoc, or the creation of public-sector ‘ghost’
jobs in which the public purse covers the cost of ‘teachers’ who actually work as family
servants).  Again and again,  Martin illustrates the link between strong social  ties (e.g.
agnatic kinship factions) and the capture of state power via elections or specific efforts to
place well-educated relatives in the civil service, the police, or the judiciary. It is odd that
he shies away from showing how his work reinforces that which came before.
10 Within the Gondal clan, Martin beautifully narrates the rise of one faction over another
owing to its affiliation with the regime of General Pervez Musharraf and the political
party he established—namely, the ‘Quaid-e-Azam’ faction of the Pakistan Muslim League
or PML-Q. During the period of his fieldwork (2004–2006),  Martin notes that landlord
factions with ties to the PML-Q fared well, even as their rivals were harassed. (One key
Gondal rival who did not defect from the ‘main’ Pakistan Muslim League to Musharraf’s
PML-Q spent  several  months in jail.)  Given the timing of  his  fieldwork,  it  is  easy to
understand why Martin felt that military rule played such a central role in reinforcing
divisions  within  established  landowning  kinship  factions  (at  the  expense  of  any
alternative economic and political formation that might have favoured the rural poor).
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However, several closely related patterns surrounding the political rivalries of agnatic
kinship factions were also present during the non-military regimes of the 1990s—a fact
that raises several questions regarding Martin’s assertion that the Pakistan Army played
the pivotal role in sustaining the political and economic landscape he describes.
11 Following Ayesha Jalal (1990), Martin notes that, throughout Pakistan’s history, military
rulers  sought to bypass existing political  parties  via non-party ‘local  body’  or  ‘union
council’ elections. (Ayub Khan sought to marginalise the Pakistan Muslim League; Zia-ul-
Haq targeted the Pakistan People’s Party.) In fact Martin notes that each of Pakistan’s
military and civilian regimes—from the Pakistan Muslim League to General Ayub Khan to
the Pakistan People’s Party to Generals Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf—has kow-towed
to exactly the same landowning kinship factions at the local level,  notwithstanding (a)
Muslim League efforts to move beyond the kinship-based rural order supported by the
(colonial-era) Punjab Unionist Party,  (b) Green Revolution reforms that enhanced the
position of ‘middling’ farmers as opposed to large landowners, (c) early Pakistan People’s
Party  rhetoric  mobilising  ‘commodified’  tenants  and  labourers  against  ‘feudal’
landowners,  and (d)  General  Zia-ul-Haq’s  effort  to  shift  Pakistan’s  political  centre  of
gravity from rural clans to urban ‘Islamism’, and so on. Indeed, Martin is correct when he
notes that the agnatic rivalries unfolding within the Gondal clan are typical of a political
order long dominated by landowning kinship factions during periods of colonial, military,
and civilian rule. But, having said this, Martin goes on to assert that this order persists
because, more than anything else,  it  is the Pakistan Army that has prevented a viable
alternative from emerging. He does not acknowledge the degree to which civilian parties
actually mirrored the work of the military’s PML-Q. (My own fieldwork, undertaken during
the 1990s,  suggests  that  civilian patterns did exactly this.)  In short,  Martin does not
appear  to  support  one  of  his  key  arguments—namely,  that  the  Pakistan  Army  is
responsible for the persistence of Pakistan’s rural economic and political order—with the
same level of ethnographic detail found in the rest of his book. This is disappointing.
12 Overall, Martin has written a beautifully detailed ethnographic account of rural politics in
Sargodha.  Even beyond his  lucid recapitulation of  my earlier  work criticising Partha
Chatterjee—specifically, Chatterjee’s sense that electoral politics underpinning arbitrary
forms of state patronage advance (rather than undermine) the well-being of the poor—
Martin advances  our understanding of  rural  politics  in at  least  three ways.  First,  he
extends our understanding of the kinship ties underpinning Pakistan’s political economy
beyond a familiar account of landowning brotherhoods, drawing our attention to the role
that kinship plays in restricting class-based solidarities amongst indebted rural labourers as
well.  Second,  he reinforces our understanding of  the electoral  battles through which
landowning brotherhoods compete for dominance at every level—not merely as a matter
of  competition  between brotherhoods  but  also  within them.  And,  finally,  albeit  less
successfully in terms of fine-grained ethnographic evidence, he urges us to stress the role
that  the  Pakistan  Army has  played  in  sustaining  a  political  landscape  dominated  by
landowning  kinship  factions  (as  opposed  to  programmatic  or  even  ideologically
progressive political parties) over time. This is an interesting book. It deserves a wide
readership.
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